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Chapter 11
Financial Advice: Does It Make a Difference?
Michael Finke
Households are faced with substantial responsibility for funding retirement
through an increasingly complex mix of financial instruments. Making
these difficult choices on their own requires investments in specific
finance-related human capital that may be neither efficient for households
nor for society. Given the large potential loss in welfare from poor financial
decisions, renting the expertise of financial professionals may be even
more useful than seeking the services of an attorney or an accountant.
Economics suggests that a household will hire a financial adviser if the
expected increase in discounted lifetime utility from receiving professional
advice exceeds the expecteddiscountedcost of fees and expenses leviedby the
adviser. A rational household would recognize the benefit of hiring someone
with financial expertise to develop a plan to invest in an efficient portfolio,
make appropriate use of risk management products, distribute financial
resources optimally across the life cycle, anddevelop a tax-minimizing bequest
strategy.
Nevertheless, despite ample evidence of poor financial decisions by
households, only about one in five relies on the advice of a financial
professional in the United States (Elmerick et al., 2002). While it is remark-
able that so few households are willing to pay for some financial help, it is
also remarkable that so many households do hire a professional despite
understanding little about the magnitude of the difference between
informed and uninformed consumption, and often very little about how
much it costs to receive the financial advice. Efforts to estimate the benefit
of advice have not shown conclusively that consumers benefit from hiring a
financial advisor (e.g., Hackethal and Inderst, 2013). This could be attrib-
uted to opaque and non-salient pricing of financial advising services and
conflicts of interest within the industry.
Problems with pricing and the measurable benefit of financial advice
may be traced to the emergence of the profession from a business that is
primarily concerned with marketing financial products (Turner and Muir,
2013). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that regulates the conduct of
broker-dealers assumes that the advice given by registered representatives is
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incidental to the sale of financial products. Customers (not clients) are
assumed to seek out the services of a representative in order to facilitate the
purchase of financial products such as a mutual fund or annuity. The
representative recommends a product that falls within the bounds of
suitability. Each party willingly participates in the transaction and presum-
ably is made better off from trade. Unfortunately, one party (the customer)
is at an informational disadvantage and may not even recognize that the
advice is solely incidental to the sale of the financial product.
There are predictable costs that arise when consumers hire an agent to
act on their behalf. As is well known, the principal and agent both seek to
maximize their own welfare, which leads to a conflict when the interests of
principal and agent are not aligned. Lusardi and Mitchell (2008) review a
number of studies that document the low level of financial literacy in the
United States. A principal (household) who knows little about financial
markets will have difficulty assessing the quality of financial advice. This
imbalance of financial knowledge between household and adviser thus can
lead to difficulty assessing service quality before and even after purchase.
This chapter reviews the literature describing the value added from
professional advice. The potential welfare gains from increased reliance
on expert financial advice are significant, and there is some evidence that
financial advisers help households make better financial decisions. Never-
theless, the results are generally mixed, and the outcomes may be worse
when there are conflicts of interest resulting from adviser compensation
incentives. In the absence of sound and consistent regulation of financial
advisers, some households may be harmed by the use of an advisor who uses
product pricing that is shrouded (not readily perceived by the consumer)
and has informational advantages to extract wealth from clients. A lack of
educational standards, reliable quality certifications, and consistent regula-
tion to reduce conflicts of interest all prevent the financial advice profes-
sion from achieving the quality of other, similar advice professions.
Who receives professional financial advice?
Campbell (2006) documents numerous examples of household financial
decision-making that are far from theoretically efficient (normatively opti-
mal). Half of all households do not own equity, despite high historical
returns and significantly reduced information and transaction costs. When
they do invest in stocks, households tend to purchase more when stock
prices are high and do not properly diversify their portfolios. Consumers
also borrow at high interest rates while simultaneously holding liquid assets
with little or no yield. Many do not refinance when they should and choose
mortgage instruments that are inappropriate. Tax complexity leads to
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additional inefficient asset location outcomes. Few households annuitize at
retirement despite obvious gains from mortality credits and protection
against outliving assets. There is no doubt that household welfare could
be improved through expert advice.
Wealth is far and away the strongest predictor of using a financial
planner, followed by high income, a college degree, and self-employment
(Finke et al., 2011). Respondents indicate that the most common reason
they chose a financial adviser was a major life event such as the receipt of an
inheritance or the sale of a business (ICI, 2007). Nevertheless, financial
advice is not solely demand-driven. Advisers market their services to clients
who have the greatest investible wealth because most compensation models
for financial advisers provide an incentive to target wealthy clients. One
reason for this is because there are often fixed costs associated with locating
new clients, meeting with them to assess their goals and establish trust, and
developing initial financial plans or product strategies. Since both commis-
sion compensation and asset under management fees rise with investible
wealth, advisors are likely to earn more per unit of effort with wealthier
clients.
Conversely, since the receipt of financial advice involves significant fixed
costs even when free—for example, the time spent meeting with the
advisor as well as evaluating and implementing advice—households with
lower wealth may estimate that the benefit from improved investing is not
worth the indirect costs. When free independent expert investment advice
was offered to 8,000 randomly selected customers of a brokerage in Ger-
many, only 5 percent of those were willing to accept it (Bhattacharya et al.,
2012). Since the advice was offered at no cost to a random sample, prefer-
ences for receiving professional financial advice were free of supply bias.
Higher wealth was strongly related to the probability of opting to receive
financial advice. Greater financial sophistication among customers who
accepted the financial advice suggests that those who anticipated gains
from better informed financial decisions motivated the demand for profes-
sional advice.
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 cohort asked respond-
ents whether they consulted a financial planner when preparing for retire-
ment. By the time of the 2008 survey, respondents were in their late 40s at
the peak saving period of their life cycles. Table 11.1 shows the percentage
of respondents by income, wealth, and cognitive ability quintiles, as well as
by level of education and by respondent self-esteem (which may impact
help-seeking behavior). Clearly, the use of a financial planner rises dramat-
ically with wealth and income: nearly ten times the percentage of respond-
ents in the top income and wealth quintile consulted a financial planner
compared to the bottom income quintile. Only 10 percent of high school-
educated respondents consulted a financial planner, more than one in
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three respondents with a college education did. Over one-third (34 per-
cent) of respondents with the highest cognitive ability scores (measured as
teenagers) used a financial planner, versus 6 percent of those in the lowest
cognitive ability quintile. Respondents with higher self-esteem were also
more likely to seek professional advice. In summary, those most likely to
seek advice are not those who are most prone to make financial mistakes.
Rather, they are most aware of the potential benefits from advice and have
Table 11.1 Household characteristics and retirement planning (%)
Household
characteristics
Consulted
a financial
planner
Calculated
retirement
needs
Used a
computer
program
Read
magazines
or books
Income
Lowest 4.0 10.2 2.5 14.1
Quintile 2 8.7 15.5 5.8 21.4
Quintile 3 15.5 24.4 11.9 32.6
Quintile 4 21.3 28.3 15.6 38.8
Highest 37.0 43.7 27.7 53.8
Net worth
Lowest 5.4 10.8 3.6 15.8
Quintile 2 7.1 14.4 5.5 21.3
Quintile 3 12.0 19.8 8.8 28.9
Quintile 4 22.8 29.6 14.5 38.1
Highest 38.2 46.1 29.5 54.4
Education
Less than high school 2.1 10.6 1.6 6.6
High school 10.2 17.1 6.3 21.7
Some college 18.5 25.1 13.5 37.6
College 33.4 41.5 25.6 51.3
Graduate 35.9 42.4 27.8 55.1
Renter 8.2 14.2 6.0 20.0
Homeowner 21.2 31.3 16.3 37.9
Cognitive ability
Lowest 5.7 12.8 4.1 15.3
Quintile 2 11.5 17.1 7.4 25.7
Quintile 3 17.9 24.0 10.4 33.9
Quintile 4 21.7 31.6 15.8 39.3
Highest 34.1 39.7 27.3 50.7
Self-esteem
Lowest 7.7 13.9 5.9 19.4
Quintile 2 15.7 22.6 11.9 29.8
Quintile 3 17.4 23.5 11.1 30.9
Quintile 4 20.1 29.0 15.3 36.8
Highest 25.7 31.9 17.5 41.0
Source: Author’s computations from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79)
2008 data.
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sufficient wealth to justify the psychic and time costs of seeing an adviser.
People more likely to seek professional advice are also more likely to self-
educate by seeking retirement-related information from books and com-
puter programs.
The fact that professional financial advice is sought by households with
more financial resources to manage is likely driven both by greater demand
among the wealthy and by greater supply of planning services to them from
advisers whose compensation increases with investible assets. These results
provide evidence that financial sophistication increases demand for pro-
fessional advice. The least sophisticated may have difficulty envisioning the
benefit of seeking information or professional assistance without a clear
understanding of the difference between their current and ideal financial
situations.
Benefits from financial advice
Studies documenting the impact of financial advisers on household invest-
ment outcomes suffer, to some degree, from an inability to differentiate
advisers according to their costs and ability to provide value. For instance, a
study of German investors by Bluethgen et al. (2008) showed that investors
who received advice had higher quality, more diversified portfolios, and
also paid higher fees on their investments. It is possible that these fees
provided compensation to the adviser for the benefits derived from
improved investment efficiency. Kramer (2012) similarly found no evi-
dence of portfolio performance differences between self-directed and
professionally advised accounts, but did report that advised accounts were
better diversified. Hackethal et al. (2011) indicated that German bank
customers who used a commission-compensated financial adviser had
lower performing portfolios net of costs, perhaps attributable to adviser
incentives to increase turnover. Since many who used advisers had greater
financial experience, the authors raised the possibility that advisers were
like babysitters—they allowed otherwise high-quality ‘parents’ to buy a
poorer-quality substitute for their costly time. It is also possible that advisors
recommend more efficient investment choices that clients do not follow
(Hackethal and Inderst, 2013).
Hung and Yoong (2013) reported that respondents who received unsoli-
cited financial advice did not improve their investment behavior, while
respondents who chose financial advice when it was optional did enhance
their financial outcomes. The authors noted that offering financial advice
as an employee benefit would help primarily the three-quarters of employ-
ees who indicated that they would use the advice if provided. It is possible
that in order for advice to be effective, a client must be motivated to seek it
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out. This may also explain why the free advice provided to bank customers
in Bhattacharya et al.’s study (2012) seemed to have little impact on
financial performance.
Neuroscience theory has recently been used to help explain how the
process of developing a financial plan can motivate a household to make
welfare-maximizing decisions they otherwise would have avoided (James,
2011). Financial decisions made in the present can compromise long-run
goals, because present thinking tends to be more emotional and less
calculated. This occurs because rational, deliberate thinking occurs in the
human cortex and we spend much of our daily lives using the emotional
mammalian (limbic) brain. Reactions to risk or to the pain of resisting
temptation are limbic responses that people attempt to control through
cognitive effort. McClure et al. (2004) show through brain imaging that the
limbic brain is primarily involved in short-run decisions, while long-run
decision-making is conducted in the cortex. These findings can help
explain why many households believe they should save more for retire-
ment, but they are also unwilling to take time in the present to increase
their contributions to their 401(k).
In such a setting, using a financial adviser has two benefits. One is that
by simply sitting down, articulating goals, and developing a financial plan,
a household is forced to apply a cooler, more rational decision-making
process to help it make better decisions that involve intertemporal trade-
offs. The second is that, by delegating some financial decisions to another
person, such decisions are now distanced from the client’s emotions.
Emotions such as loss aversion are associated with limbic responses. If a
client feels an emotional response to a market decline, an adviser can
remind the client to focus on his long-term investment policy—allowing
him to control emotions by literally providing a ‘voice of reason.’
Loss aversion can also help explain why investors appear to do a poor job
of market timing. Friesen and Sapp (2007) find that sentiment-driven flows
into equity funds following an increase in equity valuations, and away from
equity funds following a bear market, resulted in an annual underperform-
ance of 1.56 percent per year. Withdrawals from equity funds were particu-
larly harmful, causing an average loss of 15 basis points per month. There
was a 233 percent increase in the number of defined contribution partici-
pants who sold 100 percent of their equity investments during the great
recession of 2007 and 2008 (Mottola and Utkus, 2009). Winchester et al.
(2011) used a survey that asked respondents receiving comprehensive
advice (common among fee-based investment advisers) whether they
shifted their portfolio toward cash during the financial crisis. A prudent
adviser would have suggested either maintaining the current portfolio or
rebalancing away from cash following an equity market decline. The
authors found that the strongest predictor of not shifting into cash was
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whether the investor had a written financial plan. This suggests that
comprehensive planning, which often includes an investment policy state-
ment, can help reduce sentiment-driven flights to safety by individual
investors. Shapira and Venezia (2001) also reported that professional
managers were less susceptible to behavioral biases, such as the dispos-
ition effect, and that individuals can reduce losses from behavioral invest-
ment mistakes by delegating some decision-making to professional
advisers.
Table 11.2 shows results from multivariate analyses in order to estimate
the independent impact of using a financial planner on household
financial outcomes. The nationally representative data include nearly
5,000 households between the age of 42 and 49 with balance sheet
information measured in 2007. We examined net worth, wealth held in
sheltered retirement accounts, ownership of an Individual Retirement
Account (IRA), and whether the respondent had calculated the amount
of money needed to save for retirement. These are related to demo-
graphic and socioeconomic controls1 as well as an indicator of whether
the respondent consulted a financial planner in preparing for
retirement.
The evidence shows that consulting a financial planner is positively
related to net worth and retirement wealth even when controlling for
income, education, and cognitive ability. Those who have consulted a
financial planner were five times more likely to have calculated their
retirement needs. Although it is possible that financial planners are
more attracted to households that have accumulated greater assets, the
strong impact of the financial planner variable on sheltered retirement
saving and ownership of an IRA suggests that the use of planners may be
responsible for the positive financial outcomes. As noted by James
(2011), the financial planning process often involves encouraging clients
to engage in intertemporal decisions that they would otherwise avoid. In
other words, the financial planning process can force households to
acknowledge tradeoffs between present consumption and future goals,
and the use of a planner appears to help clients select investment
vehicles (such as tax-sheltered accounts) that are best suited to meet
these goals.
Incentives and investment advice
Mutual funds with lower expense ratios consistently underperform mutual
funds with higher expenses, since there is little evidence that fund man-
agers are generally able to achieve returns exceeding index benchmarks
(Fama and French, 2010). Despite this inverse relation between fund fees
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and performance, only 14.5 percent of equity mutual fund assets were
invested in lower-fee index funds in 2010 (ICI, 2011). One explanation
for this pattern is that higher-fee funds provide compensation for both
fund management and investment advice. Investors seeking advising ser-
vices buy a product that combines advice with mutual funds, providing
the adviser with indirect compensation for the added-value portfolio
Table 11.2 Financial planner regressions
Household
characteristics
Net
wortha
Retirement
wealthb
Own
IRAc
Calculated
retirement needsd
Financial planner 0.449*** 1.190*** 2.133*** 6.038***
Log(Income) 1.591*** 1.803*** 1.430*** 1.458***
Log(Net worth) – – 1.184*** 1.023*
Education (reference < high school)
High school 0.109 0.920*** 2.703* 1.117
Some college 0.008 1.036*** 2.689* 1.139
College 0.089 1.386*** 2.979** 1.235
Graduate school 0.242 1.531*** 3.266** 1.221
Male 0.025 0.557*** 0.811** 1.04
Married 0.314** 0.585*** 0.895 0.770**
Children 0.039 0.177 1.005 0.935
IQ 0.014*** 0.047*** 1.028*** 1.010***
Age (reference 43–44) (years)
45–46 0.006 0.0900 0.996 1.088
47–48 0.064 0.006 1.019 1.214*
49–51 0.062 0.145 1.230* 1.201*
Own home 3.222*** 1.539*** 1.387** 1.376***
Own business 0.298 0.277 1.602*** 1.123
Inheritance 0.435*** 0.146 1.388*** 0.995
Divorced 0.052 0.580*** 0.832 0.837
Working spouse 0.028 0.849*** 0.83 0.875
Region (reference South)
North 0.089 0.643*** 1.356*** 0.893
Northeast 0.085 0.605*** 1.420*** 0.808***
West 0.199 0.122 1.213* 1.081
Sample size (N) 4,987 4,987 4,962 4,970
Adj. R2 0.4354 0.3396 0.3002 0.2575
a This regression models the predictors of log household net worth.
b This regression models the predictors of assets held in all tax-sheltered retirement accounts.
c This regression models the predictors of holding any money in an IRA, Keogh, variable
annuity, or other tax-advantaged account.
d This regression models the predictors of having calculated retirement income needs in
retirement.
Note: ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) 2008 data.
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recommendations. In a competitive market, variation in fund fees may
reflect the value of add-on advising services (Coates and Hubbard, 2007).
Another explanation for the persistence of high fund fees may be that
the market for mutual funds is segmented by consumer sophistication,
where higher-fee funds may cater to less-sophisticated investors through
financial adviser intermediaries, and lower-fee funds cater to more sophis-
ticated investors through a direct-sales channel. Del Guercio et al. (2010)
report that mutual fund families tend to focus on catering either to direct
channel investors who are more sensitive to performance, or to broker
channel investors who value brokerage in-kind services above fund per-
formance. For example, direct channel mutual funds devote more
resources to hiring better quality fund managers to attract assets from
investors who primarily search for investment returns. The difference in
investor clientele may explain why Bergstresser et al. (2009) find that
mutual funds recommended by brokers tend to underperform on a risk-
adjusted basis. Those authors conclude that such underperformance pro-
vides evidence that professional financial advisers do not add value in terms
of investment selection. Nevertheless, professionals may still be providing
value through services incidental to the recommendation of mutual funds.
According to the Investment Company Institute (ICI, 2007), the primary
reason households seek financial advice through brokers who sell mutual
fund investments is to draw from their expertise in asset allocation and
investment options. Most financial advisers, whether they provide advising
through a broker-dealer, an insurance company, bank, or other financial
institution, obtain compensation through product commissions or a com-
bination of commissions and fees (Turner and Muir, 2013). Commissions
are often subtracted from the value of the financial product immediately
after purchase, resulting in an immediate negative return on the value of
the investment. For example, a household investing $20,000 in Class
A mutual fund shares with a 5 percent front-end load pays $1,000 in
commissions, leaving a balance of $19,000. Since no-load substitutes are
readily available, this short-term loss in wealth must be compensated by a
long-run gain in household satisfaction from the use of an adviser. Finan-
cial advisers who are compensated through commissions often justify the
commissions as payment for the value of their advising services. Neverthe-
less, such advice must be incidental to the sale of the financial product to
their customers according to the Securities Exchange Act.
An important attribute of mutual fund adviser compensation is that it
often goes unrecognized by fund investors. The most opaque form of
compensation is not front-end loads, but recurring 12b-1 fees that provide
a trail of compensation to the broker paid for by the investor and disclosed
only as part of the total fund expense ratio in the fund prospectus. This
form of compensation accounts for the popularity of fund shares classes
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(Class C) which involve adviser compensation that is more difficult to assess
than the decrease in net asset value when an investor buys front-end load
(Class A) shares. Such fees were originally framed as marketing and distri-
bution expenses when they were authorized by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1980, but they have been transformed
over time into a broader form of compensation. Evidence of the import-
ance of shrouded mutual fund fees comes from industry resistance to the
SEC’s proposal to improve fee salience (ICI, 2010). Gabaix and Laibson
(2006) present a model where product attributes are shrouded in order to
segment the market between naı¨ve consumers, who are unable to detect
differences in the shrouded attribute, and sophisticated consumers who
are aware of the attribute. Fees that are automatically deducted are attract-
ive to sellers because they often go unrecognized by consumers (are less
salient), reducing consumer sensitivity to pricing (Finkelstein, 2009). In
one interesting case, a regulatory change in India briefly allowed closed-
end funds formed within a twenty-two-month period to shroud expenses by
amortizing their cost over time in a manner similar to 12b-1 fees. Anagol
and Kim (2012) find that forty-five closed-end funds were initiated during
this brief period, compared to just two closed-end funds in the previous
sixty-six months and none after the period ended. These funds captured
half a billion dollars in excess fees during this brief period, presumably
because the shrouded fees made the funds appear more attractive to
unsophisticated investors.
Compensation and agency costs
Agency costs occur in any transaction where a principal hires an agent to
act on its behalf. Although advice relationships may not involve the actual
delegation of decision-making to the agent, the agent’s superior informa-
tion creates an opportunity to provide advice leading to decisions that can
favor the advisor’s interests over the client’s. Financial advice resembles a
credence good because it is often impossible for the consumer to judge the
quality of the recommendation, for example investment in a mutual fund,
even after purchase. To do so would require the human capital needed
to assess relative fund performance—a skill that most consumers lack
(Beshears et al., 2011). When an advisor receives greater compensation
from recommending an underperforming fund, he may do so to the extent
that his recommendation is not constrained by regulation or by the possi-
bility of losing future business.
An omniscient and selfless advisor would provide a set of recommenda-
tions that maximize the client’s expected welfare. Yet, it is neither practical
nor economically efficient to expect that a financial adviser will always act
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entirely in the interest of the client. Jensen and Meckling (1976) identify
the means through which principals can seek to minimize the costs of
delegating advice. First, people can monitor advisers by periodically assess-
ing the quality of their advice. Yet, most consumers lack the financial
knowledge to monitor effectively so the monitoring may be most efficiently
delegated to an impartial expert acting on behalf of investors (e.g.,
through the SEC or the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA)). Second, advisers can restrict their own capacity to make self-
serving recommendations through bonding. For instance, advisers who
obtain the Certified Financial Planner professional designation must main-
tain a fiduciary duty toward their clients. By obtaining a designation that
voluntarily restricts the adviser’s ability to extract rents from a client, an
agent provides a signal of reduced agency costs in order to increase
demand for his services. Third, the principal and agent can create a
contract to align the interests of the client with the adviser. The most
common contracts in the financial advice industry are product commis-
sions, fees levied as a percentage of assets under management, a combin-
ation of commissions and asset fees, and a fee-for-service model where
advisers are compensated for creating a plan or by the hour. The most
common forms of compensation for broker-dealers are commissions or a
combination of commission and fees, and assets under management fees
dominate other forms of compensation among investment advisers (Dean
and Finke, 2011).
The regulation of investment advisers as fiduciaries provides a bonding
mechanism enforced by a government entity that can efficiently monitor
excessive rent-seeking behavior. FINRA regulates advisers based on a stand-
ard of suitability. Suitability provides constraints on adviser behaviors that
are much more explicit than the fiduciary bonding mechanism provided
through regulation by the SEC. However, advisers who are constrained by
rules have an incentive to maximize rent-seeking behavior within the
boundaries of those rules to the extent that doing so is in the best interest
of the agent.
As previously mentioned, many consumers have little understanding of
how much they pay for financial advice or the potential conflicts of interest
related to adviser compensation (Hung et al., 2008). Commission compen-
sation is generally opaque since many investors are unaware of how much
they pay for investment loads, and disclosure does not appear to alleviate
this confusion (Beshears et al., 2011). In a market where price is less visible,
advisers have an incentive to maximize commission compensation con-
strained by suitability requirements and the risk of losing future revenues
from the client through excess rent extraction. As an example, commis-
sions for mutual funds often decrease on a sliding scale of breakpoints,
where larger amounts invested result in a lower commission applied to all
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invested funds. An adviser hoping to maximize commissions could allocate
an investor’s wealth across funds within a family in order to maximize
commissions, a possibility that motivated the SEC to create a task force to
eliminate the practice (NASD, 2003).
The financial advice profession often does not meet the same standards
of other professions due to the co-mingling of advice with product, which
creates potential conflicts of interest (Frankel, 2010). Of course, agency
costs will always exist in any market where a consumer must delegate
decision-making control to an expert; many financial advisers are not
held to a legal standard that requires them to make recommendations
that are in the best interest of the client, unlike most advice professionals.
Many of these advisers, who need only recommend products that are
potentially suitable to the household, use professional titles (financial
consultant, financial planner) that are similar or identical to the titles
used by advisers who are regulated as fiduciaries. Most who use an adviser,
even the more educated and wealthy, are not able to differentiate between
the two (Hung and Yoong, 2013).
Commission compensation incentivizes an adviser to sell financial prod-
ucts but does not provide incentives to invest passively. In fact, Mullai-
nathan et al. (2012) report that financial advisers often encourage clients
to engage in return-chasing behavior, possibly to increase the frequency of
trades in a manner that takes advantage of (rather than discourages) the
behavioral instinct to focus too much on investments with high recent
returns. These high sentiment investments are then likely to underperform
subsequently (Frazzini and Lamont, 2006). Indeed, Bullard et al. (2008)
find that investors who bought mutual funds through a broker channel
underperformed no-load investors by 150 basis points, primarily because of
poor investment timing. Anagol et al. (2012) also found that commission
advisers did not de-bias behavioral clients when it was not in their best
interest to do so.
A market with naı¨ve consumers and shrouded pricing creates an oppor-
tunity for commission advisers to recommend products that maximize com-
missions at the expense of consumer welfare. For instance, in India, Anagol
et al. (2012) found that insurance agents routinely recommended inferior
products to less knowledgeable customers, while simultaneously recom-
mending more suitable products to more sophisticated customers. When
given a choice between recommending more competitive products that
required price disclosure, and more expensive products that did not, insur-
ance agents recommended the latter. This tendency to recommend inferior
products with opaque pricing may be even more acute in a competitive
marketplace if consumers are unable to detect the cost of the commission
product. Agents who recommend lower-cost, lower-commission products
will ultimately be forced out of business by agents recommending less
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suitable, higher-commission products who are able to use the excess rev-
enues to increase marketing expenses, rent better placed office suites, and
hire more talented employees.
Among those who charge fees for financial planning services, 97 percent
base their fee amount on assets under management (Hung et al., 2008), a
practice that may lead advisers who charge fees to prefer higher-wealth
clients. Dean and Finke (2011) explore SEC compensation disclosures
among the 7,043 registered investment advisers in the United States and
found that those who charged commission compensation were more likely
to cater to lower net worth clients and were more likely to provide financial
planning services.
Fees may also reduce the focus on short-term advising services by creat-
ing an incentive to establish a long-run advising relationship. For example,
Finke et al. (2009) found that households that used financial planners
(who are often investment advisors compensated primarily by asset fees)
were far more likely to have adequate life insurance coverage than house-
holds who obtain financial advice from brokers. If brokers were primarily
concerned with receiving compensation from the initial sale of investment
products, they have little incentive to provide more comprehensive finan-
cial advising services. However, fee compensation is not free of potential
agency costs (Robinson, 2007). Advisers are not able to receive compen-
sation from non-investible assets, so they may be more likely to recommend
the liquidation of assets such as investment real estate or business equity.
They may also be less likely to recommend annuitization since this would
reduce the amount of invested assets. Fee compensation may also create a
disincentive to reduce debt in an investor’s portfolio since this would
require a reduction in assets. There also appears to be surprisingly little
price competition among investment advisors (Hung et al., 2008). This
may be because asset-based fees are analogous to income taxes, which are
less salient to taxpayers, while fixed and hourly fees more closely resemble
property taxes, which taxpayers seem to care much more about because the
amount paid is more readily apparent (Cabral and Hoxby, 2011).
Potential regulatory alternatives
One way of reducing increased agency costs that arise from commission
compensation might be to eliminate commissions and apply a uniform
fiduciary standard among financial advisers. To this end, the UK Financial
Services Authority (FSA) has proposed eliminating commission compen-
sation on retail investment products in 2013 (FSA, 2011). The FSA has
argued that commissions can produce incentives to withhold information
or take advantage of the information imbalance to sell products with a low
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likelihood of being declared unsuitable by regulators. Australia’s Future of
Financial Advice Committee has also recommended eliminating commis-
sions and applying a fiduciary standard of care to investment advisers.
Finke and Langdon (2012) explore differences in US state common law
standards for broker-dealers to compare non-fiduciary to strict fiduciary
states. They find no evidence that stricter fiduciary standards reduce the
number of registered representatives within these states, or negatively
impact representatives’ ability to recommend commission products or
provide services to lower-wealth clients. A universal fiduciary standard
could reduce incentives to recommend suitable products that are nonethe-
less inferior to other available products. It could also reduce consumer
confusion about the unequal application of fiduciary standards between
brokers and investment advisers.
Surveys in the United States and in Australia suggest that most respond-
ents would prefer commissions over fees when paying for financial prod-
ucts, and that the amount they would be willing to pay for financial plans is
generally much lower than the amount advisers commonly receive (e.g.,
Australian School of Business, 2010; Ody, 2011). This is consistent with
evidence that mutual fund investors appear to reward funds with more
opaque expenses, despite strong evidence that opacity is negatively related
to performance (Edelin et al., 2012). Disclosure increases competitiveness
and efficiency, but less sophisticated consumers gravitate toward products
with opaque pricing. This demand for inferior products with shrouded
prices may be caused by an underestimation of the actual cost in the
absence of full information. In a model of naı¨ve and sophisticated financial
consumers with hidden sales incentives, Inderst and Ottaviani (2011) find
that naı¨ve households will likely be exploited while sophisticated investors
may benefit from broker incentives that increase efficiency in response to
market pressures (much like dealer kickbacks on slow-selling cars allow
dealers to negotiate lower prices). There is little evidence, however, of
many sophisticated consumers who are able to perceive advice conflicts
of interest (Hung et al., 2008).
Of course, it is also possible that fewer average investors would be served
by advisers if they were unwilling to pay market prices for expert financial
advice. Preference for commission compensation may persist if consumers
assume that the prices they pay for advice are much below the full price.
This leads to the counterintuitive conclusion that many households would
be unwilling to pay for advice if they knew the cost might actually benefit
from shrouded pricing.
In addition to differences in compensation and regulation among finan-
cial advisers, there may be important differences in financial planning
knowledge that bias estimates of the value added from financial advice.
Education ranges from a university degree in financial planning that
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 14/9/2013, SPi
242 The Market for Retirement Financial Advice
includes specific instruction in investments, tax, retirement, estate, and
insurance topic areas, to a brief proprietary training session focused on
product characteristics and suitability requirements. Registered represen-
tatives of broker-dealers must pass a 7-hour Series 7 examination through
FINRA that primarily tests product knowledge and regulation. Registered
investment advisers generally must pass a 3-hour Investment Adviser Com-
petency Exam that also emphasizes knowledge of securities and regulation.
The Certified Financial Planner examination is a two-day examination that
includes topic areas focused on knowledge specifically related to providing
comprehensive financial advice. Certifications can provide a quality signal,
but only if unqualified advisers are unable to obtain the certification.
A proliferation of certifications within the financial advice industry means
that consumers are often unable to determine which are credible quality
signals. To some degree, household financial advice suffers from inconsist-
ency because it has not developed as a science-based profession with
uniform best practices and quality standards.
Age and financial advice
The most frequent reason given for not seeking professional advice among
respondents aged 60 or over is an unwillingness to hand over control of
investment decisions (ICI, 2007). The percentage of households under age
45 unwilling to delegate control over investments (57 percent) was much
lower than households aged 60 or older (82 percent). The second most
frequent reason driving the decision to avoid professional advice among
respondents in the oldest age group is the belief that they have all the
knowledge they need to invest on their own (ICI, 2007). The percentage
was again higher than among younger age groups.
This pattern is confounded by the fact that efficient processing of mental
stimuli and the ability to place it into context, or fluid intelligence, peaks in
young adulthood. Problem solving involving a combination of knowledge
and experience (crystallized intelligence) peaks around age 60 (McArdle
et al., 2002). Financial decisions require some mathematical skill, but they
primarily involve the ability to process complex information and place it
into context in a manner consistent with other decision-making domains
that require crystallized intelligence. For example, taking a sheltered
investment portfolio and turning wealth into an income stream during
retirement require knowledge of available financial instruments includ-
ing annuities and traditional investment products, an understanding of
complex and constantly changing tax laws, and knowledge of investment
and economic theory. A study of credit decisions found that credit
making decision quality peaked in the mid-50s and declined in a manner
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similar to the observed decline in crystallized intelligence (Agarwal et al.,
2009).
The Baby Boom cohort is the first having to deal with turning 401(k)
and IRA assets into consumption during retirement, and its ability to
make welfare-maximizing choices is likely to decline as the group ages.
Finke et al. (2011) show that basic financial literacy skills decline by about
2 percent each year after age 60. The decline is consistent among all
decision-making domains, including insurance, investments, credit, and
basic literacy, and the decline occurs even among the most educated and
financially sophisticated respondents. Somewhat ironically, although finan-
cial decision-making abilities decline throughout old age, confidence in
financial decisions does not. Finke et al. (2011) find that confidence
increases significantly in old age, though more educated respondents are
less (over)confident in their financial decision-making abilities. Overconfi-
dence in financial abilities may explain why fewer respondents aged 60 and
older believe they would benefit from expert financial advice (ICI, 2007).
This decline in competency with tasks requiring fluid intelligence sug-
gests that older households are able to modify behavior to avoid mistakes.
Thus, aging erodes our ability to process and react to visual stimuli while
driving, though the decline is so slight that many older drivers do not
perceive it. The good news is that, when confronted with objective evidence
of diminished driving skills, subjects subsequently changed their driving
patterns by driving during low-traffic times and avoiding complex intersec-
tions (Holland and Rabbitt, 1992). By acknowledging an inevitable decline
in financial decision-making ability, older households may be more willing
to delegate financial decisions to an expert or to choose investments that
are easier to manage such as annuities or automatically rebalancing mutual
funds.
Conclusion
There is ample evidence that households who lack the financial knowledge
needed to make efficient choices in an increasingly complex financial
marketplace. Financial advice professionals can substitute for costly and
inefficient investment in finance-related human capital by households, if
the expected benefits from better decisions exceed the costs of advice. Yet
financial advisers are often compensated through opaque commissions
and non-salient fees. Accordingly, the benefits from advice are fraught
with potential conflicts of interest.
For these reasons, a financial advice market that functions well is needed
to arm a new generation of consumers tasked with increased responsibility
for funding retirement with the information needed to make efficient
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choices. Ensuring that consumers have access to well-educated financial
advisers whose job is to make recommendations in the best interest of the
consumers seems a logical solution to this consumer information problem.
There is evidence that consumers who seek advice from fiduciary planners
who provide comprehensive advising services are much better off than
those who do not receive advice. Yet even themost sophisticated consumers
are sometimes unable to identify which advisers are most likely to provide
good advice, due to a patchwork of adviser regulations and the customer’s
inability to recognize genuine quality signals.
Equity markets in countries with greater investor protections are health-
ier because stock owners have reason to believe that managers will look out
for their interests despite significant information asymmetries (La Porta
et al., 1998). It is likely that the health of the financial advice market in the
future will depend on whether consumers are confident that the advice
professionals they hire are people whose recommendations they can trust.
Other countries are closer to the adoption of consumer protections on
advice compensation and fiduciary regulation. In the United States, an
early version of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act would have applied fiduciary
standards to all financial advice professionals. Some who benefit from
non-fiduciary regulatory standards would oppose this legislation, but like
equity and insurance markets characterized by information asymmetry,
increased consumer protections can engender trust and increase demand
for a much-needed service.
Endnote
1. Net worth and income are log transformed and negative values are set equal to
one prior to transformation.
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